We study the system of heterogeneous interbank lending and borrowing based on the relative average of log-capitalization through the linear combination of the average within groups and the ensemble average and describe the evolution of log-capitalization by a system of coupled diffusions. The model incorporates a game feature with homogeneity within groups and heterogeneity between groups where banks search for the optimal lending or borrowing strategies and intend to minimize the heterogeneous linear quadratic costs in order to remain survival in the system. Due to the complicity of the lending and borrowing system, the closed-loop Nash equilibria and the open-loop Nash equilibria are both driven by the coupled Riccati equations. The existence of the equilibria in the case of the sufficiently large number of banks is guaranteed by the solvability for the coupled Riccati equations as the number of banks goes to infinity in each group. The equilibria are consisted of the mean-reverting term identical to the one group game and the group average owing to heterogeneity. In addition, the corresponding heterogeneous mean filed game is also discussed. The existence of the ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also verified. Finally, In the financial implication, we observe the Nash equilibria governed by the mean-reverting term and the linear combination of the ensemble averages of individual groups and study the influence of the relative parameters on the liquidity rate through the numerical analysis.
Introduction
Toward a deeper understanding of systemic risk created by lending and borrowing behavior under the heterogeneous environment, we extend the model studied in from one homogeneous group into several groups with heterogeneity. The evolution of monetary reserve is described by a system of interacting diffusions with homogeneity within groups and heterogeneity between groups. Banks intend to borrow money from a central bank when they remain below the global average of capitalization treated as the critical level and lend money to a central bank when they stay above the same critical level through minimizing their cost for the corresponding lending or borrowing given by the linear quadratic objective functions with varied parameters. Furthermore, motivated by Espinosa and Touzi [2015] , instead of the global ensemble average, we propose the relative ensemble average which is the linear combination of the group average and the global ensemble average. In the case of the finite players with heterogeneous groups, we solve the closed-loop Nash equilibria using the dynamic programming principle and the corresponding fully coupled backward Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equations. In addition, through the Pontryagin minimization principle and the corresponding the adjoint forward and backward stochastic
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where the global average of capitalization and the group average of capitalization are written as
under the constraint
for i = 1, · · · , N k with nonnegative diffusion parameters σ k , nonnegative deterministic growth rate γ (k) in L ∞ -space denoted as the collection of bounded measurable functions on [0, T ]. We further assume that W for k = 1, · · · , d are the common noises between groups and within groups corresponding to the parameters ρ and ρ k for k = 1, · · · , d denoted as the correlation between groups and within groups respectively. Note that all Brownian motions are defined on a filtration probability space (Ω, F, P, {F t }) referred to as Definition 5.8 of Chapter 2 in Karatzas and Shreve [1998] . The initial value X (k)i 0 which may also be a squared integrable random variable ξ (k) for k = 1, · · · , d independent of the Brownian motions defined on (Ω, F, P, {F t }). Namely, the system of the interbank lending and borrowing contains the feature of homogeneity within the groups and heterogeneity between groups. Note that α · is a progressively measurable control process and α (k)i · is admissible if it satisfy the integrability condition given by
In addition, the parameters q k , ǫ k , and c k stay in positive satisfying q 2 k ≤ ǫ k in order to guarantee that α → f N (k) (x, α) is convex for any x and x → f N (k) (x, α) is convex for any α. The parameters 0 ≤ λ k ≤ 1 for k = 1, · · · , d are described as the relative consideration for the group average and the global average. The case of large λ means that banks consider tracing the global average rather than the group one through the large ratio on global average. Finally, q k presents the incentive of lending and borrowing behavior for banks in group k as the description in Carmona et al. [ , 2018 .
For simplicity, in case of the finite players, we study the case of two heterogeneous groups where d = 2 Hence, the dynamics for both groups are written as
and
with the initial value X (k)i 0 for k = 1, 2 and i = 1, · · · , N k . In particular, given the first group consisted of larger banks and the second group consisted of smaller banks, we may further assume that 0 ≤ λ 1 < λ 2 ≤ 1 since large banks intend to trace their own group ensemble average X (1) rather than the global average X. On the contrary, small banks prefer tracing large banks through the global ensemble average. In addition, the number of large banks N 1 is usually less than the number of small banks N 2 .
Construction of Nash Equilibria
This section is devoted to obtain the closed-loop Nash equilibria and the open-loop Nash equilibria in the finite players game. The solution to the closed-loop Nash equilibria are given by the HJB approach. The open-loop Nash equilibria are obtained using the FBSDEs based on the Pontryagin minimum principle.
Closed-loop Nash Equilibria
In order to solve the closed-loop Nash equilibrium, given the optimal strategiesα (k)j for j = i with the corresponding trajectoriesX
2)N 2 ), bank (1)i and bank (2)j intend to minimize the objective functions through the value functions written as
subject to
where W (k)i t for all k = 1, 2, i = 1, · · · , N 1 and j = 1, · · · , N 2 are standard Brownian motions and W (0) t and W (k) t for k = 1, 2 are the common noises between groups and within groups corresponding to the parameters ρ and ρ k for k = 1, · · · , 2 denoted as the correlation between groups and within groups respectively. The initial value X (k)i 0 may also be a squared integrable random variable ξ (k) . The control process α (k)i is progressively measurable and A is denoted as the admissible set given by (5) for α (k)i . Note that E t,x denotes the expectation given X t = x. Theorem 1. Assuming q 2 k ≤ ǫ k for k = 1, 2 and η (i) t and φ (i) A.27) , the value functions of the closed-loop Nash equilibria to the problem (8) and (9) subject to (10) and (11) are given by
and the corresponding closed-loop Nash equilibria arê
for i = 1, · · · , N 1 and j = 1, · · · , N 2 where
Proof. See Appendix A.
Similarly, due to the complexity of the coupled ODEs given by (A.8-A.27) , we now study the existence of the coupled system (A.8-A.27 ) in the case of N 1 → ∞ and N 2 → ∞. Proposition 1. As N 1 → ∞ and N 2 → ∞, the coupled equations (A.8) to (A.13) and (A.18) to (A.23) are rewritten as written aṡ
with the initial conditionsη
being positive for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Then, we havė
Similarly, we also get 0 ≤φ
The proof is complete.
According to the results in Proposition 1, as N 1 and N 2 are large enough, the existence of the coupled ODEs (A.8) to (A.27) are guaranteed.
Open-loop Nash Equilibria
Referring to , we now study the open-loop Nash equilibria where the strategies are the functions given at initial time. Namely, the strategies are the function of t and X 0 given in Carmona [2016] . 
where 1
Proof. See Appendix B.
Due to the complexity of coupled ordinary differential equations (ODEs) (B.19-B.27), we also verify the existence of (B.19-B.27 ) in the case of N 1 → ∞ and N 2 → ∞ where the equations are given bẏ
Similarly, as N 1 and N 2 are sufficiently large, we can verify the existence of the coupled ODEs (B.19-B.27) based on Proposition 1. We then discuss ǫ-Nash Equilibria in the case of the general d groups mean field game. Namely, N → ∞, N k → ∞ with
ǫ-Nash Equilibria: Mean Field Games
We return to the case of d groups. The i-th bank in group k minimizes the objective function given by
with q 2 k < ǫ k subject to
with the initial value X (k)i 0 which may also be a squared integrable random variable ξ (k) . In the mean field limit as N → ∞ and N k N → β k for all k, as in the case of one group, the d heterogenous groups is solved by the d-players game. Referred to , the scheme to solve the ǫ-Nash equilibria is as follows:
where a vector of standard Brownian motions
to X (k) and solve the d-players control problem through minimizing the objective function written as
Similarly, solve the fixed point problem: find m
with terminal conditions η
, the existence of the coupled ODEs (48) to (50) can be verified.
Proof. See Appendix C.
In particular, in the case of d = 2, as N → ∞, N 1 → ∞, and N 2 → ∞ with
, and φ
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T such that the ǫ-Nash equilibria in the case of the mean field game with heterogeneous groups are the limit of the closed-loop Nash equilibria in the case of the finite player game with heterogeneous groups. The results are consistent with Lacker [2018] . Hence, the asymptotic optimal strategy for bank (1)i is given bŷ
Remark 1. The case of no common noise implies the given m t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T being a deterministic function. For instance, in the case of d = 1, the ǫ-Nash equilibrium in mean field games can be obtained using the HJB equation written as
Financial Implications
The aim of this section is to investigate the financial implications for this interbank lending and borrowing model with heterogeneity. We comment on the closed-loop Nash equilibria in the case of finite players identical to the open-loop Nash equilibria. We recall the closed-loop Nash equilibria written asα
Compared to the one group scenario discussed in , the heterogeneity leads that banks not only purely consider the distance between their capitalization and averages of their own group capitalization but also consider the average of each group. Owing to the linear quadratic structure, the equilibria are the linear combination of these terms. Therefore, the corresponding optimal trajectories are written as
Observe that the drift term for an individual bank is given by the mean-reverting term at its own ensemble average and the linear combination of all group averages. In particular, as N 1 and N 2 are large enough, based on the relation η
t and φ
in Proposition 1, we rewrite the system (54-55) as
The first terms
show the lending and borrowing behavior within their own group identical to the homogeneous case. However, owing to the heterogeneity, the second terms in the mean reverting type η since the major players prefer tracing the group average rather than the ensemble average. By using varied λ 2 and N , we then obtain the following implications:
1. We first comment on two extreme cases. As λ 1 = λ 2 = 0 or β 1 = β 2 = 1, the model degenerates to the two homogeneous group model without the interaction between groups referred to .
2. In the intermediate region, in Figure 1 , we observe that the liquidity ratẽ
increases in the relative proportion λ 2 . Namely, when banks consider to trace the global ensemble average x, they intend to lend to or borrow from a central bank more frequently.
3. As the terminal time T becomes large, Figure 2 shows that the liquidity rate intends to be a constant. The identical results are obtained in .
4. As the numbers of banks N , N 1 , and N 2 become large, the liquid rate (58) 
η (4) with the varied λ 2 and the fixed λ 1 = 0.1. The fixed parameters are N = 10, N 1 = 2, N 2 = 8, q 1 = q 2 = 2, ǫ 1 = 5, ǫ 2 = 4.5, c 1 = c 2 = 0, T = 1, and γ
Conclusions
We study the system of interbank lending and borrowing with heterogeneous groups where the lending and borrowing depends on the homogeneous parameters within groups and heterogeneous 
η (4) with the varied λ 2 and the fixed λ 1 = 0.1. The fixed parameters are N = 10, N 1 = 2, N 2 = 8, q 1 = q 2 = 2, ǫ 1 = 5, ǫ 2 = 4.5, c 1 = c 2 = 0, T = 10, and γ 
parameters between groups. The amount of lending and borrowing is based on the relative ensemble averagex
The equiibrium is consisted of the term of mean-reverting at its own group average and the group ensemble average owing to heterogeneity. The numerical results illustrate that as banks intend to trace the global average as large λ k , they prefer liquidating more frequently using a larger liquidity rate. The liquidity rate is also increasing in the number of banks. The problem can be extended in several directions. First, it is interesting to discuss the delay obligation based on the model studied in Carmona et al. [2018] , Fouque and Zhang [2018] . Second, it is nature to replace the deterministic growth rate by the stochastic one. Third, referring to Fouque and Ichiba [2013] , Sun [2017] , the CIR type processes can be applied to describe the capitalization of banks. The admissible conditions for the equilibria of the above extensions are also interesting to investigate.
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A Proof of Theorem 1 and Verification Theorem
The corresponding coupled HJB equations for the value functions (8) and (9) read
The first order condition gives the candidate of the optimal strategy for bank (k)i written aŝ
Inserting (A.3) into (A.1) and (A.2) gives
We make the ansatz for V (1)i written as 6) and the ansatz for V (2)j given by
where η (i) and φ (j) for i = 1, · · · , 10 and j = 1, · · · , 10 are deterministic functions with terminal conditions 
Inserting the ansatz (A.6) and (A.7) into the HJB equations (A.1) and (A.2) using
we get
By idenfifying the terms of states X, we obtain that the deterministic functions η i and φ i for i = 1, · · · , 10 must satisfẏ (A.27) with terminal conditions 
We now discuss the existence of η (i) and φ (i) for i = 1, · · · , 10. First, observe that η (3) , η (i) for i = 5, · · · , 10, φ (2) , φ (4) , and φ (i) for i = 6, · · · , 10 are coupled first order linear equations.
The existence of η (i) and φ (i) for i = 1, · · · , 10 in the case of sufficiently large N 1 and N 2 can be verified in Proposition 1. Hence, the closed-loop Nash equilibria are written aŝ
t , (A.29) whereη i andφ i for i = 1, 4, 5, 7 satisfy (16-17).
We then verify that V (1)i , V (2)j ,α (1)i , andα (2)j are the solutions to the problem (8-11). Without loss of generality, we show the verification theorem for V (1)i .
Theorem 4. (Verification Theorem)
Given the optimal strategiesα (1)l for l = i given by (14) andα (2)j for j = 1, · · · , N 2 given by (15), V (1)i given by (A.6) is the value function associated to the problem (8) and (9) subject to (10) and (11) andα (1)i is the optimal strategy for the i-th bank in the first group and also the closed-loop Nash equilibrium.
Proof. According to the notations in Sun [2017] , an admissible strategyα and its corresponding trajectoryX are given bỹ
(A.33)
We claim for any admissible strategyα, .34) and forα .35) leading toα (1)i is the optimal strategy for i-th bank in the first group . We can assume
otherwise (A.34) holds automatically. For some M > 0, define the exit time
Given the condition (A.36), in order to complete the proof, we shall claim (A.37) and
The proof of the above properties is postponed. Given the optimal strategiesα (1)i andα (2)j , applying Itô's formula, we get
Taking the expectation on both sides and using
Assuming that there exists a constant C such that
and then the condition (A.38) implies V (1)i (T ∧ θ M , X T ∧θ M ) being uniformly integrable. Together with (A.37), we obtain as M → ∞
In addition, owing to the integrand staying nonnegative, we get
Based on the above results, we obtain
This completes the proof of (A.34). In order to prove (A.37), we first recall
Denote β > 0 large enough satisfying (1)i t .
Taking expectation on both sides gives where C 1 and C 2 are two positive constants. This proves (A.38).
B Proof of Theorem 2
Applying the Pontryagin principle to the proposed problem (1-4), we obtain the Hamiltonians written as
t + α (2)k )y
(1)i,(2)k Using ψ m,(k),h 1 t ≥ 0 for k = h 1 , the proof is complete.
